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Background. In recent years a close association between anxiety and persecutory ideation has been established,
contrary to the traditional division of neurosis and psychosis. Nonetheless, the two experiences are distinct. The aim
of this study was to identify factors that distinguish the occurrence of social anxiety and paranoid thoughts in an
experimental situation.
Method. Two hundred non-clinical individuals broadly representative of the UK general population were assessed
on a range of psychological factors, experienced a neutral virtual reality social environment, and then completed state
measures of paranoia and social anxiety. Clustered bivariate logistic regressions were carried out, testing interactions
between potential predictors and the type of reaction in virtual reality.
Results. The strongest ﬁnding was that the presence of perceptual anomalies increased the risk of paranoid reactions
but decreased the risk of social anxiety. Anxiety, depression, worry and interpersonal sensitivity all had similar
associations with paranoia and social anxiety.
Conclusions. The study shows that social anxiety and persecutory ideation share many of the same predictive
factors. Non-clinical paranoia may be a type of anxious fear. However, perceptual anomalies are a distinct predictor
of paranoia. In the context of an individual feeling anxious, the occurrence of odd internal feelings in social situations
may lead to delusional ideas through a sense of ‘things not seeming right’. The study illustrates the approach of
focusing on experiences such as paranoid thinking rather than diagnoses such as schizophrenia.
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Introduction
In the past 10 years the importance of emotion in
understanding psychosis has been increasingly rec-
ognized (Birchwood, 2003; Freeman & Freeman,
2008). The divide between psychosis and neurosis
has been narrowed. In particular, a close association
between anxiety and paranoia has been demon-
strated. Anxiety has repeatedly been found to be as-
sociated with paranoid thoughts (e.g. Martin & Penn,
2001; Johns et al. 2004) and persecutory delusions
(e.g. Freeman & Garety, 1999; Startup et al. 2007).
Anxiety is predictive of the occurrence of paranoid
thoughts (Freeman et al. 2003, 2005a; Valmaggia et al.
2007) and the persistence of persecutory delusions
(Startup et al. 2007). There is also emerging evidence
that paranoid thoughts build upon common social
anxieties such as fear of rejection (Freeman et al.
2005a,b). A key impetus of this research has been to
normalize psychotic experience and make it under-
standable. Nonetheless, paranoia and social anxiety
are distinct experiences and diﬀerences in their causes
need to be identiﬁed.
Studying persecutory ideation
There is a growing consensus that psychotic symp-
toms such as delusions are on a continuum with
normal experience (e.g. Strauss, 1969; Chapman &
Chapman, 1980; Claridge, 1997; Van Os & Verdoux,
2003). This view is based upon three lines of empiri-
cal evidence: the results of epidemiological surveys
demonstrating that delusional ideation is not con-
ﬁned to psychotic groups (e.g. Eaton et al. 1991; Van
Os et al. 2000); evidence of ‘aetiological continuity’
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ORIGINAL ARTICLEbetween non-clinical and clinical experiences (Myin-
Germeys et al. 2003); and ﬁndings that the risk of
clinical disorder is increased by the earlier presence
of low-level symptoms (Chapman et al. 1994; Poulton
et al. 2000). Although complete discontinuity between
clinical and non-clinical experiences is unlikely, the
exact nature of a paranoia spectrum remains to be
established. If delusions are caused by a number of
interacting factors then it is unlikely that there will be
a normal distribution in the general population (see
Van Os & Verdoux, 2003). Instead, the distribution
in the general population is likely to be skewed,
with many people not having any delusional experi-
ences (i.e. quasi-continuous). At an individual level
there may also be non-linear shifts into clinical dis-
order. Nonetheless, the important implication for re-
searchers is that studying non-clinical delusional
ideation can inform the understanding of clinical
phenomena, just as studying anxious or depressive
states can inform the understanding of emotional dis-
orders.
The study of persecutory ideation is beset by the
problem of justiﬁed suspicions (Freeman, 2008b).
This is a particular problem in investigating non-
clinical phenomena. Individuals can experience real
hostility from others, and paranoia questionnaires
cannot rule out thoughts that are grounded in reality.
Even using an interview assessment, it can be very
diﬃcult to establish the truth of the claims underly-
ing a suspicious thought. Therefore, an experimental
method has been pioneered to study paranoid think-
ing (Freeman et al. 2003; Freeman, 2008a). This makes
use of human responses being consistent between
real and virtual worlds (Sanchez-Vives & Slater,
2005). Virtual reality is used to present individuals
with neutral social environments (e.g. a library, train
carriage). It has been found that individuals’ inter-
pretations of the same environment vary greatly,
from the positive to the negative, providing a striking
illustration of the importance of appraisals in the ex-
perience of events. The key advantage of this method
is that any paranoid thoughts that occur are known
to be unfounded because the computer characters are
not programmed to be hostile and behave in ways
deemed by consensus to be neutral. No matter what
a person does, the characters remain neutral in their
responses.
The psychological understanding of paranoia
In the ﬁrst large-scale study of the virtual reality
method we tested 200 non-clinical individuals broad-
ly representative of the UK population (Freeman et al.
2008). Predictors of paranoia were examined based
upon a cognitive model of persecutory delusions
(Freeman et al. 2002; Freeman, 2007; Garety et al.
2007; Freeman & Freeman, 2008). In the model it is
hypothesized that individuals prone to paranoid
ideation are trying to make sense of feelings of odd-
ness caused by internal anomalies (e.g. halluci-
nations, perceptual anomalies, arousal). The causes of
anomalies of experience include core cognitive dys-
function (e.g. Hemsley, 2005), impairment in early-
stage sensory processing (e.g. Butler & Javitt, 2005),
illicit drug use (e.g. D’Souza et al. 2004), hearing im-
pairment (e.g. Zimbardo et al. 1981) and dopamine
dysregulation (e.g. Kapur, 2003). A persecutory in-
terpretation of the anomalies is likely to be formed in
the context of negative aﬀect. Suspicious thoughts
are often preceded by stressful events (e.g. diﬃcult
interpersonal relationships, bullying, isolation). The
stresses tend to happen against a background of anxi-
ety, worry and related interpersonal concerns. It is
hypothesized that anxiety is central in the threat
(mis)interpretation of the internal events. The ﬁnal
piece of the puzzle is reasoning. Ideas of a persecut-
ory content are more likely to become of a delusional
intensity when there are accompanying biases in
reasoning such as reduced data gathering (‘jumping
to conclusions’) (Garety & Freeman, 1999; Van Dael
et al. 2006) and a failure to consider alternative ex-
planations (Freeman et al. 2004). Thus, emphasized in
the psychological understanding of persecutory idea-
tion are: anomalous experiences, which may be caused
by core cognitive dysfunction and street drug use;
aﬀective processes, especially anxiety, worry and inter-
personal sensitivity; reasoning biases, particularly be-
lief conﬁrmation, jumping to conclusions and belief
inﬂexibility; and social factors, such as isolation
and trauma. In the virtual reality study, key factors in
the model – anxiety, worry, perceptual anomalies and
cognitive ﬂexibility – were all shown to predict para-
noid reactions.
The diﬀerential prediction of social anxiety and
paranoia
Social anxiety caused by the neutral social situation
was also assessed in the general population study.
Participants completed the Social Avoidance and
Distress Scale (SAD) in relation to their experience of
the virtual environment (Watson & Friend, 1969). In
this paper we report the factors that diﬀerentially
predict the occurrence of social anxiety and paranoid
thoughts in virtual reality. Although similarities be-
tween the two experiences are becoming evident, dif-
ferences are of equal theoretical and clinical interest.
Based on the persecutory delusions model, there was
an a priori prediction that anomalies of experience
would distinguish the prediction of paranoia and
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anxious will produce anxiety, but entering a social
situation when anxious and having anomalies of ex-
perience will increase the likelihood of paranoid
thinking. By contrast, it was expected that anxiety,
depression, worry, interpersonal sensitivity and
negative beliefs about the self would not distinguish
the prediction of social anxiety and paranoia (i.e. af-
fective processes contribute to the occurrence of both
experiences). It was also hypothesized that reasoning
style might be a diﬀerential predictor, but that this
may be diﬃcult to detect in a non-clinical study
where the ability to correct interpretations may be
protective against the development of clinical experi-
ences.
Method
The procedure for each participant involved com-
pletion of a comprehensive psychological assessment,
5 minutes in an underground train virtual environ-
ment, followed by assessment of the experience.
Participants
A sample of the adult local population was recruited.
A leaﬂet advertising a study of ‘people’s reactions in
virtual reality’ at the university was sent to all house-
holds in local postcodes. Participants were not in-
formed before testing that the study was of paranoia
or social anxiety. The main inclusion criterion was
that participants were aged o18 years. Potential par-
ticipants were asked whether they had ever had a
mental illness, been admitted to a psychiatric hospi-
tal, or been prescribed medication for such problems.
Individuals reporting a history of severe mental ill-
ness (e.g. schizophrenia, bipolar disorder, aﬀective
psychosis) were excluded from the study. Individuals
with a history of epilepsy were also excluded because
of potential side-eﬀects of virtual reality. Seven in-
dividuals with a history of severe mental illness and
two individuals with a history of epilepsy were ex-
cluded. One hundred male and 100 female partici-
pants were recruited. They were paid £20 for their
time. The occupationally based National Statistics
Socio-economic Classiﬁcation was used to categorize
participants (Oﬃce for National Statistics, 2005). The
study had received approval from the local research
ethics committee.
Virtual reality
The head-mounted display used was a Virtual
Research VR1280, which has a resolution of 1280r
1024 in each eye, a 60x diagonal ﬁeld of view and a
refresh rate of 60 Hz. The tracking system used for
the scenario was the Intersense IS900. The tracker
uses a hybrid of inertial and ultrasonic sensors to
determine the orientation and position of the user
during the simulation. The sensors were laid out in a
ceiling constellation grid above the user. The tracker
data were accessed by a Virtual Reality Peripheral
Network (VRPN) IS900 server.
The virtual reality environment comprised a
5-minute journey between two stops on an under-
ground train that was populated by computer charac-
ters (see Fig. 1). The Distributed Immersive Virtual
Environment (DIVE) software platform was used
to create the overall scenario (Frecon et al. 2001).
Both the train shell and the computer characters
(‘avatars’) were created using 3D Studio Max. The
avatar motions were made using an optical motion
capture system. Each avatar had its own background
motion that repeated throughout the scenario. Each
avatar had one motion that approximated their
breath and another motion that randomized the
Fig. 1. The virtual reality underground train.
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tars responded to participants’ gaze by looking in
their direction. One avatar would occasionally smile
at the user when looked at. The audio for the scene,
comprising background tube noise and low-level
snippets of conversation, was rendered in stereo,
without spatialization, using a Creative sound card.
Measures
Before entering the virtual environment participants
completed a battery of assessments.
Intellectual functioning
Wechsler Abbreviated Scale of Intelligence (WASI;
Wechsler, 1999). The WASI is a nationally standard-
ized short and reliable measure of intelligence linked
to the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale –Third
Edition (WAIS-III; Wechsler, 1997). The Vocabulary
and Matrix Reasoning subtests were used in the cur-
rent study.
Emotional processes
Depression Anxiety Stress Scales (DASS; Lovibond &
Lovibond, 1995). The DASS is a 42-item instrument
with three subscales measuring current symptoms of
depression, anxiety and stress. Each of the subscales
consists of 14 items with a 0–3 scale (0=did not ap-
ply to me at all, 3=applied to me very much). Higher
scores indicate higher levels of emotional distress.
The scale has been shown to be reliable and valid in
a large UK non-clinical population (Crawford &
Henry, 2003). The anxiety and depression subscales
were used in the current study.
Penn State Worry Questionnaire (PSWQ; Meyer et al.
1990). The PSWQ is the most established measure of
trait worry style and has been used in non-clinical
and clinical populations (see review by Startup &
Erickson, 2006). It assesses the tendency to worry but
not the content of the thoughts. Each of the 16 items
is rated on a ﬁve-point scale. Higher scores indicate a
greater tendency to worry.
Worry Domains Questionnaire (WDQ; Tallis et al. 1992).
The WDQ assesses the occurrence of a range of com-
mon (non-paranoid) worries (i.e. in contrast to the
PSWQ, the scale assesses content). It has good psycho-
metric properties (see Startup & Erickson, 2006). The
scale contains 25 items using a ﬁve-point rating scale
(from not at all to extremely). Higher scores indicate
greater levels of worry.
Catastrophizing interview (Vasey & Borkovec, 1992).
The catastrophizing interview is an experimental as-
sessment of worry style (see review of procedures by
Davey, 2006). Individuals are asked what worries
them about their main worry and this question is re-
peated for all their subsequent answers. The pro-
cedure is terminated when no further responses are
given (i.e. the person can think of no more worries in
the chain). Each answer is counted as a catastrophiz-
ing step. Increasing numbers of catastrophizing steps
indicate a greater worry style.
Brief Core Schema Scales (Fowler et al. 2006). This
measure, developed with non-clinical and psychosis
groups, has 24 items each rated on a ﬁve-point scale
(0–4). Four subscale scores are derived: negative be-
liefs about self, positive beliefs about self, negative
beliefs about others and positive beliefs about others.
Higher scores reﬂect greater endorsement of items.
Interpersonal Sensitivity Measure (Boyce & Parker, 1989).
This 36-item scale was designed to assess inter-
personal sensitivity deﬁned as undue and excessive
awareness of, and sensitivity to, the behaviour and
feelings of others. Self-statements are rated on a four-
point scale (1=very unlike self, 2=moderately unlike
self, 3=moderately like self, 4=very like self). High
scores indicate greater interpersonal sensitivity. The
psychometric properties of the scale were tested in
non-clinical individuals, general practice attenders,
and psychiatric patients.
Reasoning
Cognitive ﬂexibility (Martin & Rubin, 1995). This is a
12-item self-report scale assessing awareness that
in any given situation there are options and alter-
natives, and the willingness and conﬁdence to be
ﬂexible. Items are scores on a six-point scale (strongly
agree to strongly disagree). Higher scores indicate
greater levels of ﬂexibility. Reliability and validity
were established in a non-clinical sample.
Probabilistic reasoning (Garety et al. 2005). Jumping to
conclusions was assessed with a probabilistic reason-
ing task known as the ‘beads task’. Participants are
shown a jar with 60 black beads and 40 yellow beads
(‘the mainly black jar’) and a jar with 40 black beads
and 60 yellow beads (‘the mainly yellow jar’). The
jars are then hidden from view and the participant
told that one of the jars has been selected by the
experimenter. The participant is asked to request
as many coloured beads as they would like before
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are drawn. The key variable used here is the number
of beads requested before making a decision.
Anomalous experience
Cardiﬀ Anomalous Perceptions Scale (CAPS; Bell et al.
2006). This 32-item questionnaire, developed in both
non-clinical and psychosis groups, assesses percep-
tual anomalies such as changes in levels of sensory
intensity, distortion of the external world, sensory
ﬂooding, and hallucinations. A higher score re-
presents the reporting of a greater number of percep-
tual anomalies. The scale also has three factor scores.
The ﬁrst factor, temporal lobe experience, contains
items such as ‘Do you ever think that everyday
things look abnormal to you?’ and ‘Do you ever see
shapes, lights, or colours even though there is noth-
ing really there?’ The second factor, chemosensation,
contains items such as ‘Do you ever notice that
food or drink seems to have an unusual taste’ and
‘Do you ever smell everyday odours and think that
they are unusually strong?’ The third factor, clinical
psychosis, contains items such as ‘Do you ever hear
your own thoughts spoken aloud in your head, so
that someone near might be able to hear them?’ and
‘Do you ever hear voices commenting on what you
are thinking or doing?’
Maudsley Addiction Proﬁle (MAP; Marsden et al. 1998).
The MAP was developed with a large sample from a
substance abuse clinic. Respondents are asked di-
rectly about the use over the past month of illicit
drugs, including cannabis, cocaine powder, crack co-
caine, heroin, amphetamines and methadone.
Social
Life Stressor Checklist (Wolfe & Kimerling, 1997). The
checklist asks respondents about the occurrence of a
range of severe life events (e.g. serious accident,
physical attack, sexual abuse). If the respondent re-
ports the occurrence of an event, subsequent ques-
tions ask when the event happened, whether the
person thought at the time serious harm or death
could result, and whether feelings of intense help-
lessness, fear or horror occurred. Only events that
reached the severity criterion related to post-
traumatic stress disorder diagnosis were scored. The
total number of traumatic events, the total number of
victimization events, the number of childhood trau-
matic events, and the number of traumatic events in
the past year were recorded. The psychometric
properties of the measure are reported by McHugo
et al. (2005).
Social Support Questionnaire (SSQ; Sarason et al.
1987). The short-form of the well-established SSQ
(Sarason et al. 1983) was used. Each of the seven
items has two parts. The ﬁrst part assesses the num-
ber of people the respondent believes they can turn
to in times of need (e.g. ‘Whom can you really count
on to be dependable when you need help?’). The sec-
ond part measures the degree of satisfaction with
that support. Two scores are derived: the number or
perceived availability score and the satisfaction score.
Higher scores indicate greater perceptions of social
support.
Social and Emotional Loneliness Scale for Adults
(DiTommaso & Spinner, 1993). This 37-item self-
report questionnaire, developed in a non-clinical
sample, has three subscales: romantic, family, and
social loneliness. Each item is rated on a seven-point
scale (ranging from strongly disagree to strongly
agree). Higher scores indicate greater levels of loneli-
ness.
Measures of the virtual reality experience
After being in the virtual environment, participants
completed self-report measures of persecutory think-
ing and social anxiety and visual analogue rating
scales.
State Social Paranoia Scale (SSPS; Freeman et al. 2007).
The SSPS has 10 persecutory items each rated on a
ﬁve-point scale (e.g. ‘Someone stared at me in order
to upset me’, ‘Someone was trying to isolate me’,
‘Someone was trying to make me distressed’). The
items conform to a recent deﬁnition of persecutory
ideation (Freeman & Garety, 2000). Scores can range
from 10 (no paranoia) to 50. The SSPS has excellent
internal reliability, adequate test–retest reliability, con-
vergent validity with both independent interviewer
ratings and self-report measures, and divergent val-
idity with regard to measures of positive and neutral
thinking. In the current study the internal reliability
of the questionnaire was high (Cronbach’s a=0.90).
A person was classiﬁed as having (at least some)
paranoid thinking if they endorsed one of the para-
noid items (i.e. scored 11 or above).
Social Avoidance and Distress Scale (SAD; Watson &
Friend, 1969). The SAD was designed to assess social
anxiety. A True–False format is used for each item.
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Participants were asked to ﬁll in the questionnaire
with reference to their experience in the virtual room.
SAD items were reworded where necessary. For ex-
ample, the item ‘I usually feel relaxed when I am
with a group of people’ was changed to ‘I felt re-
laxed with the group of people’. Based upon the
original paper it was decided a priori that a score >7
(which was the median) would indicate the presence
of social anxiety.
Visual analogue rating scales (VAS). To check the valid-
ity of the post-virtual reality assessments, participants
also marked on two separate 10-cm lines the degree to
which the people on the tube were experienced as
hostile and how socially anxious the participant felt.
Higher ratings indicated greater endorsement of the
characteristic.
Analysis
Analyses were carried out using Stata version 9
(StataCorp, 2005). To look at diﬀerences in predictors
of the occurrence of paranoia and social anxiety, two
binary outcomes were created for each participant
from the SSPS and the SAD: the presence of paranoia
(>10 SSPS score) and the presence of social anxiety
(>7 SAD score). Binary outcomes were created due
to the skewed distributions of the dependent vari-
ables. The data ﬁle was structured so that there were
two records for each participant. The ﬁrst contained
all of the covariate information together with the bi-
nary indicator of paranoia. The second contained the
same covariate information together with the binary
indicator of social anxiety. The binary outcomes in-
dicating paranoia and anxiety shared the same vari-
able name but a further variable (Type) was created
to indicate whether the record corresponded to para-
noia or to anxiety (Type=1 for paranoia and Type=2
for anxiety). To analyse such a binary bivariate out-
come, the marginal modelling technique bivariate
logistic regression was used (Fitzmaurice et al. 1995;
Dunn, 2000), linking the two records for each partici-
pant by a cluster variable speciﬁed to be the partici-
pant’s ID number. The main advantage of the
bivariate logistic design is that a single regression
model is ﬁtted, instead of two separate regression
models being used, which would create separate
coeﬃcients that are not easily comparable and would
not allow for the regressions being measured on the
same individual.
In the analysis each predictor was modelled separ-
ately as an interaction with the indicator variable
Type. This is the key test for the study and indicates
whether the eﬀect of the given putative predictor is
diﬀerent for social anxiety and paranoia. Within the
Type variable paranoia was always set as the refer-
ence category, hence the interaction value represents
the interaction with social anxiety, or the change in
eﬀect between social anxiety and paranoia. In each
case the direct (unadjusted) eﬀects are ﬁrst reported.
Table 1. Demographic data
Variable Number
Sex
Male 100
Female 100
Ethnicity
White 135
Black Caribbean 18
Black African 9
Black Other 5
Indian 6
Pakistani 1
Other 26
Highest education level achieved
None 11
General Certiﬁcate of Secondary Education 39
Advanced subsidiary/Advanced level 30
Diploma/Foundation 27
Degree 55
Postgraduate diploma 34
Doctoral degree 4
Socio-economic classiﬁcation (National ﬁgure)
Higher professional occupations 16 (11.1%)
Lower managerial and professional
occupations
57 (22.4%)
Intermediate occupations 17 (10.0%)
Small employers and own account workers 12 (7.6%)
Lower supervisory and technical
occupations
8 (9.1%)
Semi-routine occupations 17 (12.8%)
Routine occupations 13 (9.3%)
Never worked and long-term unemployed 33 (3.8%)
Not classiﬁable (students) 27 (13.7%)
Frequency of use of underground train
None 44
Less than monthly 30
Monthly 38
Weekly 70
Daily 18
Frequency of playing
computer games
Never 101
Once or twice 51
Once a week 19
Most days 24
Every day 5
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ship between the predictor and the outcome; how-
ever, these direct relationships may be caused by an
extraneous variable or confounder. Confounders are
variables that are associated with the predictors
and also inﬂuence the outcome (response). Failure
to allow for this in the statistical analysis leads to dis-
tortions (bias) in the estimate of the eﬀect of the pre-
dictors. Therefore, also reported are the adjusted
eﬀects for a set of constant covariates, which
comprised age, sex, ethnicity, IQ, education, use of
computer games, use of the London underground,
socio-economic status, PSWQ, catastrophic worry in-
terview, cognitive ﬂexibility, anomalous experiences,
illicit drug use, and ‘Jumping to Conclusions’. The
covariates were deemed a priori to be clinically im-
portant predictors of paranoia and/or social anxiety.
To achieve a set of fully adjusted eﬀects the model in-
cluded the main eﬀects of each confounder and their
interaction with Type eﬀect. All hypothesis testing
was two-tailed. Odds ratios (ORs) and 95% conﬁ-
dence intervals (CIs) are reported.
Results
Demographic and clinical data
The average age of the participants was 37.5 years
(S.D.=13.3, minimum=18, maximum=77). The mean
IQ score was 104.6 (S.D.=12.0, minimum=69, maxi-
mum=133). Further basic information on the partici-
pants is presented in Table 1. There is a spread of
participants across socio-economic categories, and
the proportion in each category is broadly represen-
tative of the UK population. Table 2 shows that there
is a good range in the symptom scores of the partici-
pant group.
Social anxiety and paranoia
The visual analogue ratings were used to validate the
classiﬁcations from the SSPS and SAD. Individuals
with social anxiety (mean=4.4, S.D.=2.8) scored
higher on the VAS of social anxiety than individuals
without social anxiety (mean=1.2, S.D.=1.6, t=–7.6,
df=57.2, p<0.001). Individuals with paranoia
(mean=2.3, S.D.=1.9) scored higher on the VAS of
hostility by the computer characters than the in-
dividuals without paranoia (mean=0.8, S.D.=1.4,
t=5.9, df=170.6, p<0.001). Ninety-three people had
no paranoia or social anxiety, 59 people had paranoia
and social anxiety, 36 people had paranoia without
social anxiety and 12 people had social anxiety with-
out paranoia.
Diﬀerential predictors
The diﬀerential predictor analysis is reported in
Table 3. For the interpretation of the results it should
be noted that for continuous scales the ORs refer to
1-point changes; if the OR for a unit change in the
independent variable is, for example, 1.10 then the
OR for a 10-point increase is 1.10 raised to the power
of 10 (i.e. 2.59). For unadjusted eﬀects, only one vari-
able had a signiﬁcant interaction, Positive Self
(p value=0.006). As positive self increases by 1 unit
the odds decrease by 0.97 for paranoia and 0.87
(0.97r0.90) for social anxiety.
The unadjusted eﬀects do not take into account
any confounding caused by other factors and hence
true eﬀects may be masked or misleading. Table 3
also displays the eﬀects produced for each predictor
when adjusted for the set of potential confounders.
Two clinical variables, anomalies of experience
and family loneliness, signiﬁcantly diﬀered in their
Table 2. Assessment scores
Mean S.D. Minimum Maximum
Anxiety 4.5 5.1 0 31
Depression 7.2 8.6 0 39
Penn State Worry 45.7 14.8 16 80
Worry domain 29.4 18.8 25 108
Negative self 2.3 2.9 0 15
Positive self 14.4 4.7 3 24
Negative other 4.3 4.7 0 22
Positive other 11.2 4.6 0 24
Cognitive ﬂexibility 56.6 7.3 32 72
Perceptual anomalies 7.4 6.2 0 26
Number of lifetime traumas 2.2 2.4 0 13
Number of social supports 3.8 2.0 0.2 9.0
Satisfaction with social support 5.2 0.9 1.3 6.0
S.D., Standard deviation.
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Variable
Unadjusted (direct) Adjusted
OR p value 95% CI OR p value 95% CI
Age 0.99 0.631 0.97–1.02 1.01 0.722 0.97–1.04
TyperAge 0.98 0.130 0.95–1.01 0.98 0.468 0.94–1.03
IQ 1.00 0.706 0.98–1.03 1.04 0.039 1.00–1.08
TyperIQ 1.00 0.768 0.97–1.04 0.99 0.651 0.95–1.03
Anxiety 1.11 0.000 1.05–1.18 1.05 0.345 0.95–1.15
TyperAnxiety 0.97 0.361 0.89–1.04 1.00 0.938 0.89–1.11
Penn State Worry 1.03 0.006 1.01–1.05 1.03 0.026 1.00–1.06
TyperWorryPenn 1.02 0.132 0.99–1.05 1.01 0.507 0.98–1.05
Worry Domain 1.03 0.000 1.02–1.05 1.00 0.760 0.98–1.03
TyperWorryDom 1.01 0.251 0.99–1.03 1.04 0.067 1.00–1.07
Worry Catastrophic 1.05 0.035 1.00–1.09 1.05 0.063 1.00–1.10
TyperWorryCat 1.00 0.855 0.95–1.04 1.00 0.942 0.95–1.06
Interpersonal Sensitivity 1.04 0.001 1.01–1.06 1.02 0.170 0.99–1.06
TyperSensitivity 1.01 0.614 0.98–1.04 1.00 0.899 0.97–1.04
Negative Self 1.20 0.002 1.07–1.34 1.03 0.763 0.86–1.22
TyperNegSelf 1.02 0.743 0.91–1.15 1.08 0.382 0.91–1.30
Positive Self 0.97 0.269 0.91–1.03 1.03 0.597 0.92–1.15
TyperPosSelf 0.90 0.006** 0.83–0.97 0.89 0.076 0.78–1.01
Negative Other 1.08 0.019 1.01–1.15 1.03 0.515 0.93–1.14
TyperNegOther 0.96 0.255 0.89–1.03 0.93 0.335 0.81–1.07
Positive Other 0.97 0.271 0.91–1.03 1.03 0.460 0.95–1.13
TyperPosOther 0.95 0.188 0.88–1.03 0.92 0.109 0.84–1.02
Depression 1.06 0.006 1.02–1.10 1.03 0.362 0.97–1.10
TyperDep 1.00 0.993 0.96–1.04 1.00 0.932 0.93–1.07
Cognitive Flexibility 0.96 0.058 0.93–1.00 0.98 0.438 0.92–1.04
TyperCogﬂex 0.97 0.142 0.92–1.01 0.97 0.341 0.91–1.03
Jumping to Conclusions 1.00 0.941 0.94–1.06 1.04 0.414 0.95–1.13
TyperJTC 1.02 0.701 0.94–1.10 0.95 0.458 0.84–1.08
Anomalous Perceptions Scale 1.07 0.003 1.02–1.12 1.09 0.006 1.02–1.16
TyperAnomalous 0.95 0.084 0.90–1.01 0.91 0.007** 0.85–0.97
Romantic Loneliness 1.01 0.170 1.00–1.02 1.00 0.928 0.98–1.02
TyperRomloneliness 1.00 0.914 0.98–1.02 1.00 0.892 0.98–1.03
Family Loneliness 1.03 0.009 1.01–1.05 1.00 0.775 0.97–1.04
TyperFamloneliness 1.01 0.218 0.99–1.04 1.04 0.024* 1.00–1.07
Social Loneliness 1.02 0.035 1.00–1.04 1.00 0.704 0.98–1.03
TyperSocLone 1.01 0.556 0.99–1.03 1.01 0.334 0.99–1.04
Support Satisfaction 0.61 0.013 0.42–0.90 0.79 0.396 0.45–1.37
TyperSupSat 0.95 0.788 0.63–1.42 0.71 0.180 0.43–1.17
No. of Social Supports 0.87 0.044 0.76–1.00 0.92 0.431 0.75–1.13
TyperNoSocial 1.14 0.187 0.94–1.37 1.13 0.375 0.86–1.48
Number of Lifetime Trauma 1.12 0.091 0.98–1.27 1.01 0.904 0.83–1.23
TyperLifetrauma 0.97 0.702 0.83–1.14 1.06 0.568 0.86–1.31
Number Lifetime Victim 1.07 0.475 0.88–1.30 0.96 0.778 0.74–1.25
TyperLifeVictimization 1.07 0.495 0.87–1.32 1.32 0.076 0.97–1.81
Childhood abuse present 1.49 0.223 0.79–2.83 0.92 0.848 0.39–2.16
TyperChildabuse 0.95 0.887 0.44–2.03 1.99 0.201 0.69–5.72
Number Recent Trauma 1.37 0.276 0.78–2.43 1.08 0.828 0.53–2.22
TyperRecenttrauma 0.70 0.339 0.34–1.45 0.68 0.428 0.26–1.76
Sense of presence 0.98 0.577 0.93–1.04 0.99 0.863 0.92–1.08
TyperSenseofpresence 1.05 0.107 0.99–1.12 1.03 0.548 0.94–1.12
Illicit drug use 1.75 0.066 0.96–3.19 1.62 0.264 0.70–3.78
TyperIllicitdruguse 0.82 0.618 0.38–1.76 1.29 0.602 0.50–3.31
OR, Odds ratio; CI, conﬁdence interval.
Interaction eﬀects: * p<0.05, ** p<0.01.
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Anomalies of experience is highly statistically signiﬁ-
cant (p=0.007), indicating that the eﬀect of anomal-
ous experience is diﬀerent for paranoia and social
anxiety. The eﬀect is represented as an OR for para-
noia of 1.09 but for social anxiety 0.99 (1.09r0.91).
This means that, within paranoia, the odds increase
by 1.09 as the anomalies of experience scale increases
by 1 unit; however, within social anxiety the odds
decrease by 0.99 as the scale increases by 1 unit. An
increase on the family loneliness scale does not aﬀect
the occurrence of paranoia but increases the odds of
social anxiety by 1.04.
The CAPS assesses a wide range of phenomena,
from subtle perception distortions to auditory hallu-
cinations. It was of interest to determine whether
it was only the presence of clinical psychosis-like
symptoms that separated the two experiences. In a
post hoc analysis, the analysis was repeated using the
three factors of the scale (temporal lobe epilepsy,
chemosensation, clinical psychosis) and also a vari-
able that comprised items that could not be thought
of as psychosis-like symptoms (items 1, 15, 16, 17,
18, 20, 21, 22, 23, 25, 26, 30). Table 4 shows that the
diﬀerential relationship is not simply explained by
the presence of clinical psychosis symptoms. The un-
adjusted aﬀects do show a relationship for the sub-
scale Chemosensation (p value=0.041). In this case
the OR is calculated to be 1.14 within paranoia but
0.97 (1.14r0.85) within the social anxiety group.
Discussion
This is the ﬁrst study to examine rigorously the dif-
ferential prediction of social anxiety and persecutory
ideation. Using a sophisticated statistical analysis,
the relationships of psychological and social variables
to well-established measures of paranoia and social
anxiety were tested in a non-clinical population. The
results are intriguing. Foremost, it was the assess-
ment of perceptual anomalies that diﬀerentially
predicted paranoid and social anxiety reactions.
Individuals with paranoid reactions were prone to in-
ternal anomalous experience, whereas individuals
with social anxiety reactions were less prone to inter-
nal anomalous experience. It was not simply psy-
chosis-like anomalies but a wide range of perceptual
experiences, from the mild to the severe, that pre-
dicted psychological reactions. For instance, items in
the chemosensation subscale, which mainly relate to
olfactory and gustatory experiences, include: ‘Do
you ever smell everyday odours and think that they
are unusually strong?’, ‘Do you ever think that food
or drink tastes much stronger than it normally
would?’, ‘Do you ever ﬁnd that your skin is more
sensitive to touch, heat or cold than usual?’ The im-
portance of perceptual anomalies to paranoia is con-
sistent with the cognitive model of paranoia. Having
odd internal feelings in social situations may lead
to delusional ideas through a sense of ‘things not
seeming right’. However, an important caveat is that
the nature of the association of paranoia and percep-
tual anomalies was not established in the study.
Anomalies at the time of testing were not assessed.
A causal role can only be established in a study that
manipulates anomalies of experience, in a rando-
mized controlled design similar to the report by
Zimbardo et al. (1981). Such causal designs are now
indicated in research on the psychology of psychosis.
The emphasis in the report has been on identifying
diﬀerences between anxious and suspicious thinking.
However, the absence of diﬀerences for the majority
of the variables is a striking ﬁnding. Participants’ lev-
els of anxiety, depression, worry and interpersonal
sensitivity had similar relationships to both social anx-
iety and paranoia. This very much conﬁrms recent
Table 4. Diﬀerential prediction using the subscales of the anomalous perceptual experiences scale
Variable
Unadjusted (direct) Adjusted
OR p value 95% CI OR p value 95% CI
Temporal lobe 1.17 0.011 1.04–1.32 0.90 0.575 0.63–1.29
TyperTemplobe 0.92 0.265 0.79–1.07 1.18 0.474 0.75–1.84
Chemosensation 1.14 0.027 1.02–1.29 0.91 0.605 0.63–1.31
TyperChemosensation 0.85 0.041* 0.73–0.99 0.79 0.322 0.50–1.25
Clinical psychosis 1.54 0.008 1.12–2.13 1.07 0.825 0.60–1.91
TyperClinpsychosis 0.75 0.130 0.52–1.09 1.19 0.648 0.56–2.54
Nonpsychosis anomalies 1.12 0.011 1.03–1.23 0.97 0.852 0.73–1.30
TyperNonpsychosis 0.91 0.105 0.80–1.02 0.81 0.197 0.59–1.11
OR, Odds ratio; CI, conﬁdence interval.
Interaction eﬀects: * p<0.05.
What makes one person paranoid and another person anxious? 1129ideas about the contribution of anxiety to paranoid
experience, but challenges the more traditional view
of clear-cut distinctions between psychotic and
emotional problems. Paranoia can be conceptualized
as a type of anxious fear. The clinical implication is
that approaches used to treat anxiety disorders, suit-
ably modiﬁed, will also be of beneﬁt to people with
paranoia (Freeman et al. 2006). This is an emerging
research strategy that focuses on experiences such as
paranoid thoughts, not on diagnoses such as schizo-
phrenia, and treats problems as on a continuum of
severity in the population.
There were a number of limitations to the study
that should be kept in mind. Multiple hypothesis
testing was carried out, raising the likelihood of the
occurrence of Type I errors, although the results were
broadly consistent with the current theoretical under-
standing of paranoia. Furthermore, the dependent
variables had considerable skew, leading to their di-
chotomization and a reduction in statistical power.
Inevitably the identiﬁcation of paranoid thinking
and social anxiety depends on self-report. The study
therefore relied on people being able to report their
thoughts from the time spent in virtual reality. The
participants were volunteers, responding to a leaﬂet
distributed to local postcodes, who did not know be-
forehand that they were taking part in a study of
paranoia. They were broadly representative of the
UK in terms of employment status. However, this re-
cruitment method is unlikely to have resulted in a
truly representative sample of the population being
tested. It is also clear that this is a study of low-level
persecutory and anxious thinking. Similar studies
looking at diﬀerential prediction in more severe in-
stances would be of great interest.
Acknowledgements
This research was supported by a Wellcome Trust
Fellowship awarded to D.F.
Declaration of Interest
None.
References
Bell V, Halligan PW, Ellis HD (2006). The Cardiﬀ
Anomalous Perceptions Scale (CAPS). Schizophrenia
Bulletin 32, 366–377.
Birchwood M (2003). Pathways to emotional dysfunction in
ﬁrst episode psychosis. British Journal of Psychiatry 182,
373–375.
Boyce P, Parker G (1989). Development of a scale to
measure interpersonal sensitivity. Australian and New
Zealand Journal of Psychiatry 23, 341–351.
Butler PD, Javitt DC (2005). Early-stage visual processing
deﬁcits in schizophrenia. Current Opinion in Psychiatry 18,
151–157.
Chapman LJ, Chapman JP (1980). Scales for rating
psychotic and psychotic-like experiences as continua.
Schizophrenia Bulletin 6, 476–489.
Chapman LJ, Chapman JP, Kwapil TR, Eckbald M, Zinser
MC (1994). Putatively psychosis-prone subjects 10 years
later. Journal of Abnormal Psychology 103, 171–183.
Claridge G (1994). Single indicators of risk for schizo-
phrenia. Probably fact or likely myth? Schizophrenia
Bulletin 20, 151–168.
Claridge G (1997). Schizotypy: Implications for Illness and
Health. Oxford University Press: Oxford.
Crawford JR, Henry JD (2003). The Depression Anxiety
Stress Scales (DASS): normative data and latent structure
in a large non-clinical sample. British Journal of Clinical
Psychology 42, 111–131.
DiTommaso E, Spinner B (1993). The development and
initial validation of the social and emotional loneliness
scale for adults. Personality and Individual Diﬀerences
14, 127–134.
D’Souza DC, Perry E, MacDougall L, Ammerman Y,
Cooper T, Wu Y, Braley G, Gueorguieva R, Krystal JH
(2004). The psychotomimetic eﬀects of intravenous
delta 9-tetrahydrocannabinol in healthy individuals:
implications for psychosis. Neuropsychopharmacology 29,
1558–1572.
Dunn G (2000). Statistics in Psychiatry. Arnold: London.
Eaton WW, Romanoski A, Anthony JC, Nestadt G (1991).
Screening for psychosis in the general population with a
self-report interview. Journal of Nervous and Mental Disease
179, 689–693.
Fitzmaurice GM, Laird NM, Zahner GEP, Daskalakis C
(1995). Bivariate logistic regression analysis of
childhood psychopathology ratings using multiple
informants. American Journal of Epidemiology 142,
1194–1203.
Fowler D, Freeman D, Smith B, Kuipers E, Bebbington P,
Bashforth H, Coker S, Gracie A, Dunn G, Garety P
(2006). The Brief Core Schema Scales (BCSS):
psychometric properties and associations with paranoia
and grandiosity in non-clinical and psychosis samples.
Psychological Medicine 36, 749–759.
Frecon E, Smith G, Steed A, Stenius M, Stahl O (2001). An
overview of the COVEN platform. Presence: Teleoperators
and Virtual Environments 10, 109–127.
Freeman D (2007). Suspicious minds: the psychology of
persecutory delusions. Clinical Psychology Review 27,
425–457.
Freeman D (2008a). Studying and treating schizophrenia
using virtual reality: a new paradigm. Schizophrenia
Bulletin. Published online: 28 March 2008. doi: 10.1093/
schbul/sbn020.
Freeman D (2008b). The assessment of persecutory ideation.
In Persecutory Delusions (ed. D. Freeman, R. Bentall and
P. Garety). Oxford University Press: Oxford.
1130 D. Freeman et al.Freeman D, Freeman J (2008). Paranoia: The 21st Century
Fear. Oxford University Press: Oxford.
Freeman D, Freeman J, Garety P (2006). Overcoming
Paranoid and Suspicious Thoughts. Robinson Constable:
London.
Freeman D, Garety PA (1999). Worry, worry processes and
dimensions of delusions: an exploratory investigation
of a role for anxiety processes in the maintenance of
delusional distress. Behavioural & Cognitive Psychotherapy
27, 47–62.
Freeman D, Garety PA (2000). Comments on the content
of persecutory delusions: does the deﬁnition need
clariﬁcation? British Journal of Clinical Psychology 39,
407–414.
Freeman D, Garety PA, Bebbington P, Slater M, Kuipers
E, Fowler D, Green C, Jordan J, Ray K, Dunn G (2005a).
The psychology of persecutory ideation. II. A virtual
reality experimental study. Journal of Nervous and Mental
Disease 193, 309–315.
Freeman D, Garety PA, Bebbington PE, Smith B,
Rollinson R, Fowler D, Kuipers E, Ray K, Dunn G
(2005b). Psychological investigation of the structure of
paranoia in a non-clinical population. British Journal
of Psychiatry 186, 427–435.
Freeman D, Garety PA, Fowler D, Kuipers E, Bebbington
P, Dunn G (2004). Why do people with delusions fail to
choose more realistic explanations for their experiences?
An empirical investigation. Journal of Consulting and
Clinical Psychology 72, 671–680.
Freeman D, Garety PA, Kuipers E, Fowler D,
Bebbington PE (2002). A cognitive model of
persecutory delusions. British Journal of Clinical
Psychology 41, 331–347.
Freeman D, Pugh K, Antley A, Slater M, Bebbington P,
Gittins M, Dunn G, Kuipers E, Fowler D, Garety P
(2008). A virtual reality study of paranoid thinking in the
general population. British Journal of Psychiatry 192,
258–263.
Freeman D, Pugh K, Green C, Valmaggia L, Dunn G,
Garety P (2007). A measure of state persecutory ideation
for experimental studies. Journal of Nervous and Mental
Disease 195, 781–784.
Freeman D, Slater M, Bebbington PE, Garety PA, Kuipers
E, Fowler D, Met A, Read C, Jordan J, Vinayagamoorthy
V (2003). Can virtual reality be used to investigate
persecutory ideation? Journal of Nervous and Mental
Disease 191, 509–514.
Garety PA, Bebbington P, Fowler D, Freeman D, Kuipers
E (2007). Implications for neurobiological research of
cognitive models of psychosis. Psychological Medicine 37,
1377–1391.
Garety PA, Freeman D (1999). Cognitive approaches to
delusions: a critical review of theories and evidence.
British Journal of Clinical Psychology 38, 113–154.
Garety PA, Freeman D, Jolley S, Dunn G, Bebbington PE,
Fowler D, Kuipers E, Dudley R, (2005). Reasoning,
emotions and delusional conviction in psychosis. Journal
of Abnormal Psychology 114, 373–384.
Hemsley DR (2005). The schizophrenic experience: taken
out of context? Schizophrenia Bulletin 31, 43–53.
Johns LC, Cannon M, Singleton N, Murray RM, Farrell M,
Brugha T, Bebbington P, Jenkins R, Meltzer H (2004).
The prevalence and correlates of self-reported psychotic
symptoms in the British population. British Journal of
Psychiatry 185, 298–305.
Kapur S (2003). Psychosis as a state of aberrant salience:
a framework linking biology, phenomenology,
and pharmacology. American Journal of Psychiatry 160,
13–23.
Lovibond PF, Lovibond SH (1995). The structure of
negative emotional states: comparison of the Depression
Anxiety Stress Scales (DASS) with the Beck depression
and anxiety inventories. Behaviour Research and Therapy 33,
335–343.
Marsden J, Gossop G, Stewart D, Best D, Farrell M,
Lehmann P, Edwards C, Strang J (1998). The Maudsley
Addition Proﬁle (MAP). Addiction 93, 1857–1867.
Martin JA, Penn DL (2001). Brief report: social cognition
and subclinical paranoid ideation. British Journal of
Clinical Psychology 40, 261–265.
Martin MM, Rubin RB (1995). A new measure of cognitive
ﬂexibility. Psychological Reports 76, 623–626.
McHugo GJ, Caspi Y, Kammerer N, Mazelis R, Jackson
EW, Russell L, Clark C, Liebschutz J, Kimerling R
(2005). The assessment of trauma history in women with
co-occurring substance abuse and mental disorders and a
history of interpersonal violence. Journal of Behavioural
Health Services and Research 32, 113–127.
Meyer TJ, Miller ML, Metzger RL, Borkovec TD (1990).
Development and validation of the Penn State
Worry Questionnaire. Behaviour Research and Therapy
28, 487–495.
Myin-Germeys I, Krabbendam L, van Os J (2003).
Continuity of psychotic symptoms in the community.
Current Opinion in Psychiatry 16, 443–449.
Oﬃce for National Statistics (2005). The National Statistics
Socio-economic Classiﬁcation. Palgrave Macmillan:
Hampshire.
Poulton R, Caspi A, Moﬃtt TE, Cannon M, Murray R,
Harrington H (2000). Children’s self-reported psychotic
symptoms and adult schizophreniform disorder. Archives
of General Psychiatry 57, 1053–1058.
Sanchez-Vives MV, Slater M (2005). From presence to con-
sciousness through virtual reality. Nature Reviews
Neuroscience 6, 332–339.
Sarason IG, Levine HM, Basham RB, Sarason BR (1983).
Assessing social support: the Social Support
Questionnaire. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology
44, 127–139.
Sarason IG, Sarason BR, Shearin EN, Plerce GR (1987).
A brief measure of social support. Journal of Social and
Personal Relationships 4, 497–510.
Startup H, Freeman D, Garety PA (2007). Persecutory
delusions and catastrophic worry in psychosis:
developing the understanding of delusion distress and
persistence. Behaviour Research and Therapy 45, 523–537.
Startup HM, Erickson TM (2006). The Penn State Worry
Questionnaire. In Worry and Its Psychological Disorders
(ed. G. Davey and A. Wells), pp. 101–120. Wiley:
Chichester.
What makes one person paranoid and another person anxious? 1131StataCorp (2005). Stata Statistical Software: Release 9.0.
Stata Corporation: College Station, TX.
Strauss JS (1969). Hallucinations and delusions as points
on continua function. Archives of General Psychiatry 20,
581–586.
Tallis F, Eysenck MW, Mathews A (1992). A questionnaire
for the measurement of nonpathological worry.
Personality and Individual Diﬀerences 13, 161–168.
Valmaggia L, Freeman D, Green C, Garety P, Swapp D,
Antley A, Prescott C, Fowler D, Kuipers E, Bebbington
P, Slater M, Broome M, McGuire P (2007). Virtual
reality and paranoid ideations in people with an ‘at risk
mental state’ for psychosis. British Journal of Psychiatry
191, s63–s68.
Van Dael F, Versmissen D, Janssen I, Myin-Germeys
I, van Os J, Krabbendam L (2006). Data gathering:
biased in psychosis? Schizophrenia Bulletin 32,
341–351.
Van Os J, Hanssen M, Bijl RV, Ravelli A (2000). Strauss
(1969) revisited: a psychosis continuum in the general
population. Schizophrenia Research 45, 11–20.
Van Os J, Verdoux H (2003). Diagnosis and classiﬁcation
of schizophrenia: categories versus dimensions,
distributions versus disease. In The Epidemiology of
Schizophrenia (ed. R. M. Murray, P. B. Jones, E. Susser,
J. van Os and M. Cannon), pp. 364–410. Cambridge
University Press: Cambridge.
Vasey M, Borkovec TD (1992). A catastrophising assess-
ment of worrisome thoughts. Cognitive Therapy and
Research 16, 505–520.
Watson D, Friend R (1969). Measurement of
social-evaluative anxiety. Journal of Consulting and
Clinical Psychology 33, 448–457.
Wechsler D (1997). Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale – Third
Edition. The Psychological Corporation: San Antonio,
TX.
Wechsler D (1999). Wechsler Abbreviated Scale of
Intelligence (WASI). The Psychological Corporation:
San Antonio, TX.
Wolfe J, Kimerling R (1997). Gender issues in the
assessment of posttraumatic stress disorder. In Assessing
Psychological Trauma and PTSD (ed. J. Wilson and
T. Keane), pp. 192–238. Guilford Press: New York.
Zimbardo PG, Andersen SM, Kabat LG (1981). Induced
hearing deﬁcit generates experimental paranoia. Science
212, 1529–1531.
1132 D. Freeman et al.